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Abstract
This paper concerns the representation of introspective belief and knowledge in
multi-agent systems. An introspective agent is an agent that has the ability to refer
to itself and reason about its own beliefs. It is well-known that representing intro-
spective beliefs is theoretically very problematic. An agent which is given strong
introspective abilities is most likely to have inconsistent beliefs, since it can use
introspection to express self-referential beliefs that are paradoxical in the same way
as the classical paradoxes of self-reference. In multi-agent systems these paradoxical
beliefs can even be expressed as beliefs about the correctness and completeness of
other agents’ beliefs, i.e., even without the presence of explicit introspection. In
this paper we explore the maximal sets of introspective beliefs that an agent can
consistently obtain and retain when situated in a dynamic environment, and when
treating beliefs “syntactically” (that is, formalizing beliefs as axioms of ﬁrst-order
predicate logic rather than using modal formalisms). We generalize some previous
results by Perlis [1985] and des Rivie`res & Levesque [1988].
1 Introduction
Formal languages and theories can be used to represent and reason about
agents and their beliefs about the world (including other agents and the agents
themselves). A large number of diﬀerent types of languages and theories
have been proposed to this aim. Theories of ﬁrst-order predicate logic seem
particularly attractive for this purpose because of their high expressive power,
and because of the extensive use of ﬁrst-order logic 2 in computational systems
such as the ones used in logic programming. But ﬁrst-order theories have two
major drawbacks:
(i) Complexity : provability in ﬁrst-order logic is only semi-decidable.
1 Email: tb@imm.dtu.dk
2 By “ﬁrst-order logic” we everywhere mean “ﬁrst-order predicate logic”.
183
c©2002 Published by Elsevier Science B. V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Bolander
There are three boxes present.
Everything agent 2 believes is true.
The black box is on the white box.
Something agent 1 believes is not true.
Fig. 1. Two agents having beliefs about each other.
(ii) Inconsistency : representing introspective beliefs of agents (that is, the
kind of beliefs that agents have of their own beliefs) often leads to para-
doxes and inconsistency of the systems in which these beliefs are repre-
sented.
In this paper we will concentrate on ways to circumvent (ii) such that we
can have consistent ﬁrst-order logics of introspective beliefs—that is, we con-
centrate on ways to obtain consistent formalisms for introspection while still
retaining the expressiveness of ﬁrst-order logic.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give an informal moti-
vating example showing how indirect introspective beliefs can lead to incon-
sistency. In Section 3 we introduce more formally the “syntactic approach”
to belief representation, and introduce a number of general principles of belief
(called epistemic principles) which we expect our agents to satisfy. In Section
4 it is shown, though, that in general we cannot make our agents satisfy these
principles. More precisely, it is shown that theories containing these principles
will be inconsistent. In Section 5 we consider ways of restricting the principles
such that we can have consistent theories containing them. The main result in
this direction is Theorem 5.9. It is shown that there does not exist consistent
principles much stronger than those proven to be consistent by this theorem.
2 A Motivating Example
Consider the situation depicted in Figure 1. We have here a blocks world with
two agents, agent 1 (on the left) and agent 2 (on the right). We assume that
the beliefs of agent 1 are given completely by the following two propositions
S1 and T1:
S1 : The black box is on the white box.
T1 : Everything agent 2 believes is true.
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Furthermore, we assume the beliefs of agent 2 to be given completely by:
S2 : There are three boxes present.
T2 : Something agent 1 believes is not true.
The reason for agent 2 to believe that agent 1 has a false belief could e.g. be
that agent 2 sees that agent 1 cannot see the dotted box (the black box is
blocking the view of agent 1), and agent 2 therefore expects agent 1 to have
the false belief that there are only two boxes present.
The problem with the presented two-agent situation is that it is paradoxi-
cal. It turns out that no matter whether we assume T1 to be a true or a false
proposition, we are lead to a contradiction. The argument is as follows:
Assume ﬁrst that T1 is true: then everything agent 2 believes is true, and in
particular T2 must is true. That is, something agent 1 believes is not true. But
this is a contradiction, since S1 is deﬁnitely true, and T1 is true by assumption.
Assume now that T1 is false: then something agent 2 believes must be
false. But since S2 is true, it must be T2 that is false. From this it follows
that every belief of agent 1 must be true. But T1 is among agent 1’s beliefs,
and this proposition is assumed to be false. Again we have a contradiction.
That is, it is neither consistent to assume that T1 is true, nor that it is
false. This is a paradox. The conclusion we have to draw from this paradox is
that any formal framework for reasoning about agents in which the situation
in Figure 1 is possible must be inconsistent.
At ﬁrst sight the example does not seem to have to do with introspection
and self-reference, since the agents have no explicitly given beliefs about them-
selves. But introspection and self-reference is obtained indirectly: the belief
T1 of agent 1 refers to every belief of agent 2. In particular T1 refers to T2,
which in turn refers back to T1. It is this presence of indirect self-reference in
the beliefs of the agents that leads to the paradox.
The argument of the paradox given above can be formalized in ﬁrst-order
logic, thus showing that not all beliefs can be treated consistently when for-
malized in ﬁrst-order logic. Theorem 4.2 in Section 4 gives a number of ex-
amples of beliefs of agents that makes the ﬁrst-order theory in which they are
formalized inconsistent.
Based on the paradox and its formalizability in ﬁrst-order logic, our main
goal becomes:
to ﬁnd suitable restrictions on the (indirect) introspective and self-referential
beliefs such that consistency can be ensured.
This is is the goal that we will pursue throughout this article.
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3 Representing Beliefs of Agents
Representing beliefs of agents as axioms of ﬁrst-order predicate logic is called
the syntactic approach to belief representation. In the syntactic approach, a
belief is represented as a formula Bi(ϕ) where Bi is a predicate symbol, ϕ is
a sentence of ﬁrst-order logic (possibly containing Bi), and · is some coding
scheme. By a coding scheme we understand any injective map · from the
set of sentences of the language in question into the set of closed terms of that
language. Bi(ϕ) should be read as: “agent i believes that ϕ”.
In the so-called semantic approach to belief representation, Bi is a modal
operator rather than a predicate symbol. To express that “agent i believes
ϕ” we would then simply write Biϕ. In the semantic approach no coding is
needed.
The syntactic approach is preferred to the semantic one because of its
expressiveness. In the syntactic approach a statement like e.g. “agent 1
has no contradictory beliefs” can be expressed by the formula ¬∃x(B1(x) ∧
B1(not(x))), assuming that we have appropriate axioms for the function not .
But this statement can not be expressed in the semantic approach, since even
if we have a modal logic with variables (such as ﬁrst-order modal logic),
the modal operator can not be applied directly to the variables—that is,
Bix (or ✷x) is not a well-formed modal formula and therefore neither is
¬∃x (Bix ∨ ¬Bix). The propositions T1 and T2 of the example above can
not be expressed as sentences in a model logic either.
Through the use of axioms such as Bi(ϕ) we can construct formal the-
ories to represent facts of, and to reason about, multi-agent systems. Such
systems could for instance be distributed computer systems, where each pro-
cess is considered to be an agent. It could also be e.g. systems of autonomous
robots acting in some shared environment.
Example 3.1 Consider again the situation depicted in Figure 1. One way of
representing this situation could be by a theory T including axioms
on(white box,ﬂoor)
on(black box,white box)
on(dotted box,ﬂoor)
B1 (on(white box,ﬂoor))
B1 (on(black box,white box))
B2 (on(dotted box,ﬂoor))
B2 (∃x (is-box(x) ∧ on(black box, x)))
Bi (on(black box,white box)→ ¬on(black box,ﬂoor)) for i = 1, 2
where B1 (on(white box,ﬂoor)) means that agent 1 believes the white box to
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be on the ﬂoor, and B2 (∃x(is-box(x) ∧ on(black box, x))) means that agent
2 believes that the black box is on some other box (but he cannot see which
one, since the dotted box is blocking his view).
When having described a multi-agent system as a formal theory T , reason-
ing about this system and the beliefs of its agents amounts to proving theorems
in T , since every theorem of T becomes a fact concerning the system.
The theory T given above is quite weak and does not allow us to deduce
much about the beliefs of agent 1 and agent 2. We even cannot infer
Bi(¬on(black box,ﬂoor))
from
Bi (on(black box,white box)→ ¬on(black box,ﬂoor))
and
Bi(on(black box,white box)),
since we have no axioms or inference rules allowing this. Therefore, to make
such theories useful as reasoning mechanisms, we should include general epis-
temic principles such as e.g.
Bi(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Bi(ϕ)→ Bi(ψ)) for all i and all sentences ϕ, ψ
meaning that the beliefs of all agents are closed under modus ponens.
Below we give a list of some of the most common such principles, translated
into ﬁrst-order logic from the corresponding principles in modal logic. These
principles are, for all sentences ϕ, ψ in our language,
(R2)
ϕ
Bi(ϕ)
(A1) Bi(γ) when γ is a valid sentence in ﬁrst-order predicate logic
(A2) Bi(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Bi(ϕ)→ Bi(ψ))
(A3) Bi(ϕ)→ ϕ
(A4) Bi(ϕ)→ Bi (Bi(ϕ))
(A5) ¬Bi(ϕ)→ Bi (¬Bi(ϕ))
(D) Bi(ϕ)→ ¬Bi(¬ϕ)
(BC1) Bi (Bj(ϕ)→ ϕ)
(BC2) Bi (ϕ→ Bj(ϕ))
(O) ϕ↔ Bi(ϕ)
(BC1) says that agent i believes all of agent j’s beliefs to be correct (true).
When i = 1 and j = 2 this expresses the belief T1 of agent 1 in the example of
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Section 2. (BC2) says that agent i believes agent j to believe everything that
is correct (true). (O) is called the omniscience principle. This is a very
strong principle saying that everything believed is true, and that everything
true is believed. Agents satisfying this principle are called omniscient: they
possess complete and correct knowledge of the world. (O) is recognized to
be identical to Tarski’s schema for truth, schema T, in ﬁrst-order logic (see
e.g. [12]). We should not in general expect agents to satisfy a strong principle
such as (O), but we include it among our epistemic principles anyway since,
as we will see in Section 5, proving consistency results for restricted versions
of (O) will automatically give us consistency results for restricted versions of
all the other epistemic principles.
In many cases we might not want our epistemic principles to be instantiated
with every single sentence of the language. For instance, an agent might only
be omniscient with respect to some small part of the world. If this part of the
world can be described through the sentences of some set M , then we could
have
ϕ↔ Bi(ϕ) for all ϕ ∈M
instead of
ϕ↔ Bi(ϕ) for all sentences ϕ.
Let L denote any ﬁrst-order language. Let M be a set of sentences of L, that
is, let M ⊆ L. 3 By (O)M we understand the set of instances of (O) with
sentences ofM . (O)M is called the omniscience principle overM . (R2)M ,
(A1)M–(A5)M , (D)M , (BC1)M , and (BC2)M are deﬁned similarly to be
the set of instances of the respective epistemic principles over M .
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let M be a set of sentences of some ﬁrst-order language L.
By an epistemic theory over M we understand any combination of
(R2)M , (A1)M–(A5)M , (D)M , (BC1)M , (BC2)M , and (O)M ,
that is, any combination of the epistemic principles given above with ϕ and
ψ instantiated over M .
4 The Problem of Obtaining Consistency
We can think of the epistemic principles as something being added to a base
theory. By a base theory we understand any theory T in L satisfying: 4
(i) If ϕ ∈ T then either ϕ does not contain any of the Bi’s, or ϕ = Bi(ψ)
for some ψ not containing any of the Bi’s.
(ii) If Bi(ϕ) ∈ T then T  ϕ.
These two characterizing properties can be paraphrased as:
3 We identify ﬁrst-order languages with their set of sentences.
4 A theory T in L is simply a set of sentences of L.
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(i’) There are no meta-beliefs (beliefs about beliefs) in T .
(ii’) Everything believed by an agent in T is true (in T ).
The theory considered in Example 3.1 is a base theory. A base theory describes
the environment in which the agents are situated as well as the agents’ ﬁrst-
order beliefs about this environment. Condition (ii) simply says that all (ﬁrst-
order) beliefs about the environment are correct. Agents might of course in
some situations have false beliefs, but we do not consider such beliefs as part
of the base theory.
When we construct a theory T for reasoning about a multi-agent system,
our choice of epistemic principles should not depend on our choice of base
theory. For one thing, the epistemic principles only give general properties of
belief (or knowledge), and our choice of these should only depend on what kind
of “modality” (or propositional attitude) Bi is supposed to capture. Another
thing is that in a changing environment the base theory might change over
time to reﬂect these changes in the environment, but this should not aﬀect
the epistemic principles and their validity. But, surprisingly, it turns out that
whether a theory including a set of epistemic principles is consistent or not
depends crucially on the chosen base theory. To see this, let us ﬁrst introduce
the notion of universal consistency.
Deﬁnition 4.1 An epistemic theory E is called universally consistent if,
for any consistent base theory B, the theory B ∪ E is consistent.
All epistemic theories used to reason about agents should of course be
universally consistent: if not, we could end up in that very peculiar situation
that our theory could suddenly become inconsistent just from updating some
axioms of the base theory. But:
Theorem 4.2 No epistemic theory extending any of the following theories is
universally consistent.
(1) (R2) + (A1) + (A3).
(2) (A1) + (A2) + (A3) + (BC1).
(3) (A1) + (A2) + (A4) + (D) + (BC1).
(4) (A1) + (A2) + (D) + (BC1) + (BC2).
Proof. Trivially, when a theory is not universally consistent, neither is any
extension of it. We therefore only need to prove that none of (1)–(4) is uni-
versally consistent. That (1) and (2) are not universally consistent is a direct
consequence of a theorem of Montague in [7]. That (3) is not universally
consistent is a direct consequence of a theorem of Thomason in [13]. Both
these theorems are reviewed in [3] and [8]. Finally, that (4) is not universally
consistent is proved in Section 5.3. ✷
The fact that (1) is not universally consistent is probably not a serious
problem, since (R2) is a very strong principle that beliefs of agents would not
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be likely to satisfy (at least not in the syntactic treatment). We might also in
many cases take (2) to be too strong, since (A3) excludes the possibility of
an agent having a false belief (though, in other cases, when reasoning about
agents, it seems appropriate to assume that the agents will never believe any-
thing that is not true). But, as we see from (3) and (4), even if (R2) and
(A3) are excluded, we can still get an epistemic theory which is not universally
consistent.
The theorem shows, as also suggested by the example of Section 2, that
assuming agents to have certain seemingly natural beliefs and assuming their
beliefs to satisfy certain seemingly natural principles can make the entire rea-
soning framework in which these beliefs are represented inconsistent.
Based on this negative result our main problem now becomes: to ﬁnd sets
of sentences M with which we can safely instantiate our epistemic theories,
that is, to ﬁnd sets M ⊆ L for which the epistemic theories over M are
universally consistent. This problem is the subject of the following section.
5 Some Universally Consistent Epistemic Theories
In this section we let L denote a ﬁxed ﬁrst-order language. We assume that
L contains a number of unary predicate symbols B1, B2, . . . , Bn (n > 0). In
the following we will, for simplicity, only concentrate on ﬁnding sets M ⊆ L
for which (O)M is universally consistent. We can do this without loss of
generality, for, as the following lemma shows, if (O)M is universally consistent
then so is any other epistemic theory over M .
Lemma 5.1 Let M ⊆ L be a set of sentences satisfying
if ϕ, ψ ∈M then Bi(ϕ),¬ϕ, ϕ→ ψ ∈M. 5
If the omniscience principle over M , (O)M , is universally consistent, then
every epistemic theory over M is universally consistent.
Proof. Assume M satisﬁes the requirement, and that (O)M is universally
consistent. Let B be an arbitrary consistent base theory. We have to show
that then
C = B ∪ (R2)M ∪ (A1)M ∪ · · · ∪ (A5)M ∪ (D)M ∪ (BC1)M ∪ (BC2)M
is also consistent. Since we know (O)M to be universally consistent, B∪(O)M
must be consistent. If we therefore can prove that
(O)M  (R2)M ∪ (A1)M ∪ · · · ∪ (A5)M ∪ (D)M ∪ (BC1)M ∪ (BC2)M
then C must be consistent as well, and this will conclude the proof. We only
prove (O)M  (D)M . The rest of the epistemic principles can in the same
5 That is, M is closed under application of Bi, ¬, and →.
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way easily be shown to follow from (O)M . To show that (O)M  (D)M , let
ϕ be any sentence in M . Then we have the following proof in (O)M :
1. ϕ↔ Bi(ϕ) axiom
2. ¬ϕ↔ Bi(¬ϕ) axiom (M is closed under ¬)
3. ϕ↔ ¬Bi(¬ϕ) by 2.
4. Bi(ϕ)↔ ¬Bi(¬ϕ) by 1. and 3.
5. Bi(ϕ)→ ¬Bi(¬ϕ) by 4.
showing that the ϕ-instance of (D), Bi(ϕ)→ ¬Bi(¬ϕ), holds in (O)M .✷
The above lemma tells us that if we know (O)M to be universally consistent
then any epistemic theory can safely be instantiated with each of the sentences
of M .
5.1 Well-founded Epistemic Theories
Our ﬁrst universal consistency result is a slightly generalized version of a result
of des Rivie`res & Levesque [3]. We start out with a couple of new deﬁnitions. A
coding scheme · is said to be well-founded if there is no inﬁnite sequence
of sentences ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . such that for all i ∈ N, ϕi contains ϕi+1 as a
term. In the following we will assume all considered coding schemes to be
well-founded. 6
Deﬁnition 5.2 Let ϕ, ψ be formulas of L. We say that ϕ is contained in ψ
if one of the following is the case
(i) ϕ is a sub-formula of ψ
(ii) there is a sub-formula Bi(γ) of ψ such that ϕ is contained in γ.
Note, that “contained in” above is deﬁned recursively, and the deﬁnition
only makes sense when the coding scheme is well-founded. By our deﬁnition,
if ϕ and ψ are formulas and A is a one-place predicate symbol diﬀerent from
all the Bi’s, then ϕ is contained in e.g. both ϕ∧ψ and Bi (Bi(ϕ)) but not
in A(ϕ).
The following theorem tells us that we can always safely instantiate our
epistemic theories with sentences such as
B1 (B2 (¬on(black box,ﬂoor)))
6 It can easily be seen that in any ﬁrst-order language containing inﬁnitely many ground
terms it is possible to construct a well-founded coding scheme. Furthermore, any “standard”
Go¨del coding will obviously be well-founded.
191
Bolander
in which we have nested beliefs, but not necessarily with sentences such as
B1 (∃x(B1(x) ∧ ¬B2(x)))
in which we have quantiﬁed beliefs.
Theorem 5.3 (After des Rivie`res & Levesque [3]) The theory
{ϕ↔ Bi(ϕ) | ϕ is a sentence not containing Bi(x)}
is universally consistent. Thus, by Lemma 5.1, any epistemic theory over a
set of sentences not containing Bi(x) is universally consistent.
Example 5.4 The theorem shows that consistency is ensured if we refrain
from expressing quantiﬁed beliefs. In the example of Section 2 both T1 and
T2 are quantiﬁed beliefs, quantifying over the beliefs of agent 2 and agent
1, respectively. The theorem tells us that we would not be able to derive
a paradox if the agents had no such quantiﬁed beliefs. Without quantiﬁed
beliefs we can always reason about multi-agent systems consistently.
We will prove the theorem by another method than that of des Rivie`res
& Levesque, who used a careful translation from a modal logic to prove their
result. The important thing about our method is that it can be considered as
a general method for proving these kinds of universal consistency results.
For every set M ⊆ L we deﬁne a functional FM : (L → {t, f}⊥) → (L →
{t, f}⊥) 7 by, for all sentences ϕ, ψ, ∀xγ(x) ∈ L,
FM([[·]])(ϕ ∧ ψ) =


t if [[ϕ]] = [[ψ]] = t
⊥ if [[ϕ]] = ⊥ or [[ψ]] = ⊥
f otherwise
FM([[·]])(¬ϕ) =


f if [[ϕ]] = t
t if [[ϕ]] = f
⊥ otherwise
FM([[·]])(∀xγ(x)) =


t if [[γ(τ)]] = t for all terms τ in L
⊥ if [[γ(τ)]] = ⊥ for some term τ in L
f otherwise
FM([[·]])(Bi(ϕ)) = [[ϕ]] for all ϕ ∈M
The ﬁrst three conditions above are recognized to correspond to Kleene’s weak
three-valued logic with ⊥ as the third value. The fourth condition will ensure
7 {t, f}⊥ denotes the set {t, f,⊥}. t denotes “true” and f denotes “false”. Mappings
L → {t, f}⊥ are used to represent partial functions, where the value ⊥ means “undeﬁned”
(for further information see e.g. [11]).
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that in any ﬁxed point 8 of FM we will have
[[Bi(ϕ)]] = FM([[·]])(Bi(ϕ)) = [[ϕ]] for all ϕ ∈M. (1)
Let F : (L → {t, f}⊥)→ (L → {t, f}⊥) be a functional. The set of initial
elements of F , denoted init(F ), is deﬁned as
init(F ) = {ϕ ∈ L | F ([[·]])(ϕ) = ⊥ for all [[·]] : L → {t, f}⊥} .
For FM we have
init(FM) = {ϕ ∈ atoms(L) | ϕ is not on the form Bi(ψ) for some ψ ∈M} . 9
By an initial extension of F we understand any functional G that extends 10
F and satisﬁes
G([[·]])(ϕ) ∈ {t, f} for all ϕ ∈ init(F ) and all [[·]] : L → {t, f}⊥.
Now we can state an important lemma:
Lemma 5.5 Let M be a subset of L containing at least all sentences in which
none of the Bi’s occur. If every initial extension of FM has a total ﬁxed point
11
then (O)M is universally consistent.
Proof. 12 Assume every initial extension of FM has a total ﬁxed point. Let B
be any consistent base theory. We need to prove that B ∪ (O)M is consistent.
Since B is consistent there exists some language L′ ⊇ L in which B has a
Herbrand model H. Deﬁne an initial extension J of FM by using the truth-
values from H as values for the initial elements of FM . By assumption, J has
a total ﬁxed point [[·]]. Let H ′ be the Herbrand interpretation 13 deﬁned by
H ′ = {ϕ ∈ atoms(L′) | [[ϕ]] = t} .
A simple induction proof on the syntactic complexity of ϕ now shows that for
all ϕ ∈ L′ we have
H ′ |= ϕ⇔ [[ϕ]] = t. (2)
This is proved using the deﬁnition of H ′ and the ﬁrst three deﬁning conditions
of FM . Now, by (1) above we have [[Bi(ϕ)]] = [[ϕ]] for all ϕ ∈M . Using (2),
8 A function [[·]] : L → {t, f}⊥ is a ﬁxed point of a functional G : (L → {t, f}⊥)→ (L →
{t, f}⊥) if G([[·]]) = [[·]].
9 atoms(L) denotes the set of ground atoms in L.
10G extends F if for all maps [[·]] and all ϕ, F ([[·]])(ϕ) is either undeﬁned (has the value
⊥) or has the same value as G([[·]])(ϕ).
11A ﬁxed point [[·]] : L → {t, f}⊥ is total if it maps every ϕ ∈ L into {t, f}.
12The space available unfortunately only allow us to sketch the proofs. Contact the author
to obtain the full proofs.
13As usual, Herbrand interpretations are identiﬁed with subsets of the Herbrand base (see
e.g. [6]).
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this gives us
H ′ |= ϕ↔ Bi(ϕ) for all ϕ ∈M.
This means that (O)M holds in H
′. Furthermore, from the choice of initial
extension of FM , it can be shown that B holds in H
′ as well. Thus H ′ is a
model of B ∪ (O)M , and this proves the consistency. ✷
We now deﬁne the notion of a semantic graph. For any functional F , we
deﬁne the semantic graph of F as the directed graph (L,→F ) with nodes
L, and edge relation →F given by
ψ →F ϕ ⇔ for all [[·]], if [[ψ]] = ⊥ then F ([[·]])(ϕ) = ⊥.
One way of expressing the condition on the right-hand side is that “the truth-
value of ψ is needed to determine the truth-value of ϕ”. In this sense, the
semantic graph is a graph of semantical dependency : there is an edge from ψ
to ϕ iﬀ ϕ depends semantically on ψ.
Lemma 5.6 Let M ⊆ L. If the semantic graph of FM is well-founded then
any initial extension of FM has a total ﬁxed point.
Proof. Let J be an initial extension of FM . For f, g : L → {t, f}⊥ we deﬁne
f ⊆ g to mean that everywhere f is deﬁned, g has the same value as f (i.e.,
∀x(f(x) = ⊥ → f(x) = g(x))). It is easy to show that J is monotone on
L → {t, f}⊥ with respect to the ordering ⊆. Furthermore, L → {t, f}⊥ is a
ccpo 14 with respect to ⊆, and therefore J must have a least ﬁxed point [[·]]
([5]). To prove that [[·]] is total, assume the opposite. Since the semantic graph
(L,→J) = (L,→FM ) is well-founded, there must be a →FM -minimal element
on which [[·]] is undeﬁned. But this is easily seen to lead to a contradiction.✷
Lemma 5.7 The well-founded part of the semantic graph of FL is the sub-
graph induced by the set
{ϕ ∈ L | ϕ does not contain Bi(x)} .
We leave out the proof of this lemma. It is proven by considering the deﬁn-
ing conditions of FL and by using that · is a well-founded coding scheme.
Now Lemma 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 together immediately give us a proof of
Theorem 5.3:
Proof. [of Theorem 5.3] Let M = {ϕ ∈ L | ϕ does not contain Bi(x)}. By
Lemma 5.5 it is suﬃcient to prove that every initial extension of FM has a
total ﬁxed point. But, by Lemma 5.7, the semantical graph of FM is well-
founded, and therefore Lemma 5.6 immediately gives the required result. ✷
14Chain complete partial order. See e.g. [5].
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5.2 Positive Epistemic Theories
In the following we assume that the only propositional connectives used in
ﬁrst-order formulas are ∧, ∨, and ¬ (i.e. not using → or ↔).
The machinery we have introduced above also immediately gives a proof
of the following theorem, which follows from a result proven independently by
Perlis in [9] and Fefermann in [4].
Theorem 5.8 (After Perlis [9] and Fefermann [4]) The theory
{ϕ↔ Bi(ϕ) | ϕ is a sentence of L in which no Bi occurs in the scope of ¬}
is universally consistent. Thus, by Lemma 5.1, any epistemic theory over a set
of sentences in which no Bi occurs in the scope of ¬ is universally consistent.
Proof. Let M be the set of positive sentences of L. By Lemma 5.5 it is
suﬃcient to prove that any initial extension of FM has a total ﬁxed point. Let
J be any initial extension of FM . Let (L,→J) be the semantic graph of J .
Using Lemma 5.6 we can construct a ﬁxed point on the well-founded part of
the semantic graph. By Lemma 5.7, this gives us a ﬁxed point [[·]]′ on the set
of sentences not containing Bi(x). Now deﬁne a functional G by
G([[·]])(ϕ) = [[ϕ]]′ ∪ FM([[·]])(ϕ) 15
for all [[·]] and ϕ. It can be seen that G  (L → {t, f}) is monotone with
respect to the ordering on {t, f} given by f < t. Thus G has a total ﬁxed
point, and this will be a ﬁxed point of FM as well. ✷
5.3 Stronger Epistemic Theories
¿From the proof given for Theorem 5.8 above, we see that we have actually
proven something even stronger:
Theorem 5.9 (Strengthening of Theorem 5.3 and Theorem 5.8) The
theory
{ϕ↔ Bi(ϕ) | ϕ is a sentence of L in which no Bi(x) occurs
in the scope of ¬}
is universally consistent. Thus, by Lemma 5.1, any epistemic theory over a
set of sentences in which no Bi(x) occurs in the scope of ¬ is universally
consistent.
Example 5.10 This theorem gives us a larger set that we can safely instanti-
ate our epistemic principles with than given by the two previous results. The
15 For all p, q ∈ {t, f,⊥}, p∪q is the supremum of p and q wrt. to the ordering: ⊥ < t,⊥ < f .
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theorem proves that we can both safely instantiate with sentences such as
¬Bi(on(black box,ﬂoor))
(which was not covered by Theorem 5.8) and sentences such as
∀x (B1(x) ∧B2(x))
(which was not covered by Theorem 5.3).
Let M = {ϕ ∈ L | no Bi(x) occurs in the scope of ¬ in ϕ}. It can easily
be seen that M is very close to being a maximal set of sentences with which
any epistemic principle can safely be instantiated. Actually, even a sentence
such as ∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬Bi(x)), which is one of the simplest sentences not in M ,
is not safe to instantiate with:
Lemma 5.11 If M is a set containing the sentence ∀x(A(x)∨¬Bi(x)), where
A = Bi, then (O)M is not universally consistent.
Proof. Let L be a ﬁrst-order language with equality and let · be any coding
scheme in L. Let ϕ = ∀x (A(x) ∨ ¬Bi(x)) and let M = {ϕ}. We then have
(O)M = {ϕ↔ Bi(ϕ)}. Let B = {∀y (y = ϕ↔ ¬A(y))}. B is obviously
consistent. We want to show that B∪(O)M is not, which proves that (O)M is
not universally consistent. To obtain a contradiction, assume that B ∪ (O)M
is consistent. Then it has a modelM in which = denotes equality. This gives
us the following sequence of implications
M |= ϕ⇒M |= ∀x (A(x) ∨ ¬Bi(x))⇒M |= ∀x (x = ϕ ∨ ¬Bi(x))⇒
M |= ϕ = ϕ ∨ ¬Bi(ϕ)⇒M |= ¬Bi(ϕ)⇒M |= ¬ϕ,
which shows that M |= ϕ. At the same time we have
M |= ¬ϕ⇒M |= ∃x (¬A(x) ∧Bi(x))⇒M |= ∃x (x = ϕ ∧Bi(x))⇒
M |= ϕ = ϕ ∧Bi(ϕ)⇒M |= Bi(ϕ)⇒M |= ϕ,
which shows thatM |= ¬ϕ. Now we have bothM |= ϕ andM |= ¬ϕ, which
is a contradiction. ✷
This lemma also shows that (4) of Theorem 4.2 is not universally consis-
tent. The argument is as follows. (O) is inconsistent by the above lemma, so
for some sentence ϕ we have (O)  ϕ and (O)  ¬ϕ. Now, for any theory U
and any sentence ϕ, a simple induction on the proof length shows that
U  ϕ ⇒ {Bi(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ U} ∪ (A1) ∪ (A2)  Bi(ϕ). 16 (3)
Letting U = (O), {Bi(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ U} becomes the theory (BC1) ∪ (BC2),
16We assume that ﬁrst-order predicate logic is formulated such that the only rule of inference
is modus ponens (see e.g. [1]).
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and by (15) we then get
(BC1) ∪ (BC2) ∪ (A1) ∪ (A2)  Bi(ϕ) ∧Bi(¬ϕ)
which contradicts (D). Thus (4) is not universally consistent.
6 Conclusion
As argued in e.g. [2,8,9,10] representing beliefs of agents should be done syn-
tactically through predicates of ﬁrst-order logic to ensure suﬃcient expressiv-
ity. Unfortunately it turns out that representing beliefs syntactically easily
leads to inconsistency of the representing system [7,8,13]. This calls for work
in ﬁnding consistent ways to treat beliefs syntactically, that is, to ﬁnd re-
stricted ways of representing beliefs in ﬁrst-order logic such that consistency
will necessarily be retained. Some of the most important previous results in
this direction can be found in [3,8,9]. In this article we have reached a result
which generalizes both [9] and [3]. This result shows that as long as we refrain
from expressing quantiﬁed negated beliefs (as e.g. in ∀x (B1(x)→ ¬B2(x)))
consistency is always ensured. Our result generalizes [9] by allowing negated
beliefs (in [9] negated beliefs like ¬B1(ϕ) will be treated non-classically),
and generalizes [3] by allowing quantiﬁed beliefs ([3] does not allow quantiﬁed
beliefs like ∀x (B1(x) ∨B2(x))).
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